James Ashley Fennell, II v. Edward D. Green, Neil Wall, AKA Neil J. Wall, and GMW Development Inc., DBA Ivory North : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
James Ashley Fennell, II v. Edward D. Green, Neil
Wall, AKA Neil J. Wall, and GMW Development
Inc., DBA Ivory North : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul M. Belnap, Andrew D. Wright; Strong & Hanni; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Green;
Barbara K. Berrett, Shane W. Norris; Weiss Berrett Petty, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee GMW;
Dave Hamilton; Elizabeth A. Hruby-Mills, Brandon B. Hobbs, Christian S. Collins; Richards,
Brandt, Miller and Nelson; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Wall.
LaVar E. Stark, Frank M. Wells; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Fennell v. Green, No. 20011029 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3621
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES ASHLEY FENNELL, II, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
EDWARD D. GREEN, NEIL WALL, aka 
NEIL J. WALL, and GMW 
DEVELOPMENT INC., dba IVORY 
NORTH, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Civil No. 000601295 PD 
Court Of Appeals No. 20011029SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
GMW DEVELOPMENT INC., dba IVORY NORTH 
Appeal from Summary Judgment entered by 
The Honorable Thomas L. Kay, 
Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah 
Lavar E. Stark (3080) 
Frank M. Wells (3424) 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell 
Paul M. Belnap (0279) 
Andrew D. Wright (8857) 
STRONG &HANNI 
Boston Building, Sixth Floor 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Green 
Dave Hamilton (1318) 
SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON PC 
4723 Harrison Blvd. #200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Wall 
Elizabeth Hruby-Mills (6573) 
Brandon B. Hobbs (8206) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Wall 
Barbara K. Berrett (4273) 
BERRETT & ASSOCIATES, L.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 530 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Ivory North 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES ASHLEY FENNELL, II, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
EDWARD D. GREEN, NEIL WALL, aka 
NEIL J. WALL, and GMW 
DEVELOPMENT INC., dba IVORY 
NORTH, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Civil No. 000601295 PD 
Court Of Appeals No. 20011029SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
GMW DEVELOPMENT INC., dba IVORY NORTH 
Appeal from Summary Judgment entered by 
The Honorable Thomas L. Kay, 
Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah 
Lavar E. Stark (3080) 
Frank M. Wells (3424) 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Fennell 
Paul M. Belnap (0279) 
Andrew D. Wright (8857) 
STRONG & HANNI 
Boston Building, Sixth Floor 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Green 
Elizabeth Hruby-Mills (6573) 
Brandon B. Hobbs(8206) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Wall 
Barbara K. Berrett (4273) 
BERRETT & ASSOCIATES, L.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 530 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Ivory North 
Dave Hamilton (1318) 
SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON PC 
4723 Harrison Blvd. #200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Wall 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 1 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature of the Case 2 
B. The Course of Proceedings 3 
C. Facts Relevant to the Issues on Appeal 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 10 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED IVORY NORTH'S 
MOTION.FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON FENNEL'S FAILURE 
TO DISPUTE THE RELEVANT FACTS SET FORTH IN IVORY NORTH'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT IVORY 
NORTH_DID NOT HAVE ANY KNOWLEDGE OF ANY GEOLOGICAL 
CONDITION ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY OR THE POSSIBILITY 
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BEING THE SITE OF POTENTIAL 
LANDSLIDES 15 
III. THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD DENY FENNEL'S APPEAL BECAUSE IT 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
American Towers Owners Ass h, Inc. v. CCIMech, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 
(Utah 1996) 13,14 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) 2 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317 (1986) 2 
First Sec. Bankv.Banberry Dev. Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 30-31 (Utah 1990) 16 
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 746 P.2d 1182,1184 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 2, 18 
Maak\. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d at 582-583 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 14 
McVayv. Western Plains Service Corp., 823 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1987) 2 
Otsuka Electronics (USA, Inc., v. Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937 P.2d 1274, 1277 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) 1, 13 
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 18 
Steele v. Bd. of Rev. of Indus. Com 'n, 845 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 19 
Tibbitts v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967) 15 
Trees v. Lewis, 738P.2d612, 13 (Utah 1987) 18 
Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 44 (Utah 1978) 18 
Rules 
4-501(2)(b), Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 10, 11, 12, 13 
Rule 11(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 18 
Rule 11(f) pt 11(g), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 18 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 11, 17 
Rule 24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 17 
Rule 24(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 17 
Rule 24(j), UtahRules of Appellate Procedure 18 
Section 70A-2-316(3)(a), Utah Commercial Code 15 
4 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
None are applicable. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as 
amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court properly grant Ivory North's Motion for Summary Judgment 
based on Fennel's failure to dispute the relevant facts set forth in Ivory North's Motion for 
Summary Judgment? In examining the trial court's order granting summary judgment, the 
appeals court determines only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and 
whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact. Otsuka 
Electronics (USA, Inc., v. Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
The Appellate Court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the 
trial court, even if it is one not relied upon by the trial court. Id. 
2. Did the trial court properly conclude that Ivory North did not have any knowledge 
of any geological condition on the subject property, the Maughan report or evaluation of the 
subject property, or the possibility of the subject property being the site of potential landslides? 
A "genuine" issue of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment exists only if the non-moving 
party provides evidence which is "sufficiently probative" that "a reasonable jury could return a 
1 
verdict for the non-moving party " Anderson v Liberty Lobby Inc , 477 U S 242, 248 (1986) 
More specifically, in Celotex Corp v Catrett, Ml US 317 (1986), the Supreme Court clarified 
that a party seeking to avoid summary judgment must demonstrate genuine issues of material 
fact with respect to each essential element of its case as to which it bears the burden of proof at 
trial Id Conclusory allegations will not establish issues of fact sufficient to defeat summary 
judgment McVayv Western Plains Service Corp , 823 F 2d 1395 (10th Cir 1987) 
3. Should the Appellate Court deny Fennel's Appeal because it does not comply 
with Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure9 "If a party fails to make a concise statement 
of the facts and citation of the pages in the record where those facts are supported, the court will 
assume the correctness of the judgment below " Kouhs v Standard Oil Co of California, 1A6 
P 2d 1182, 1184 (Utah Ct App 1987) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
In the Spring of 1995, Fennell contacted Ivory North regarding constructing a new home 
based upon the Ivory Homes Newport model Fennell, however, did not approve of any of the 
available lots then owned by Ivory North Consequently, Fennell and Ivoi y North investigated 
various lots in the Layton area, eventually finding a lot in the Falcon Ridge subdivision 
On or about May 18, 1995, Plaintiff and Ivory North entered into a Real Estate Purchase 
Agreement for the purchase of a home built on Lot 31 of Falcon Ridge loc ated in the city of 
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Layton, Utah. Ivory North then constructed the home, which was inspected and approved by 
Fennell. On or about December 22, 1995, Fennell moved into the home. 
On or about April 14, 1998, Fennell alleges that a landslide occurred on the property. No 
one was injured as a result of the landslide, nor was any other property damaged or destroyed. 
On or about April 7, 2000, Fennell filed a Complaint. In particular, Fennel alleged that part of 
the area of the land subdivided as Falcon Ridge Phase 2, including Lot 31, was subject to 
landslides and erosion, that the fact that the land is subject to landslides and erosion was known 
or should have been known to Ivory North, as a professional subdivider, developer, seller, and 
builder. 
B. The Course of Proceedings 
On October 25, 2001, Ivory North's motion for summary judgment came on regularly for 
hearing. The Court after reviewing the submitted memorandum and hearing oral arguments 
granted Ivory North's motion for summary judgment on all causes of action. Generally, the 
Court held that Fennel failed to properly dispute the relevant facts set forth in Ivory North's 
Motion, and therefore, Ivory North's Statement of Undisputed Facts were deemed admitted due 
to the lack of response. Specifically, the Court held that it was undisputed that Ivory North did 
not have any knowledge of any geological condition on the subject property, had no knowledge 
of the report and evaluation of the property prepared by Glenn Maughan, and had no knowledge 
of the possibility of the subject property being the site of potential landslides. 
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C. Facts Relevant to the Issues on Appeal 
1. In the spring of 1995, Fennell contacted Ivory North regarding constructing a new 
home based upon Ivory Newport model. See Deposition Transcript of Jamies Fennell at R.351. 
2. Fennell and Ivory North investigated various lots in the Layton area, eventually 
finding the lot in the Falcon Ridge subdivision. See Deposition Transcript of James Fennell at 
R.351, and Affidavit of Karen Galloway at R.354. 
3. Ivory North did not encourage Fennell to select the lot in the Falcon Ridge 
subdivision. See Deposition Transcript of James Fennell at R.351 and Affidavit of Karen 
Galloway at R.354. 
4. Ivory North has no interest in the Falcon Ridge subdivision, did not own the lot 
selected by Fennell, and did not participate in any manner in the subdividing of Falcon Ridge. 
See Affidavit of Karen Galloway at R.354. 
5. Ivory North had no knowledge regarding any geological conditions or alleged 
problems with soil on the subject property or the Falcon Crest subdivision. See Affidavit of 
Karen Galloway at R.354. 
6. On or about May 18, 1995, Fennell and Ivory North entered into a Real Estate 
Purchase Agreement ("Agreement") for the purchase of a home built on Lot 31 of Falcon Ridge 
located in the city of Layton, Court of Davis. See Real Estate Purchase Agreement at R.357. 
7. Section 3.7 of the Agreement states: 
IVORY HOME WARRANTY. At or after CLOSING, SELLER 
shall provide BUYER with a home buyers warranty (the" IVORY 
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HOME WARRANTY") from SELLER (or in SELLER'S sole 
discretion, a third party providing such warranties) that covers the 
HOUSE and that contains terms and conditions then being 
provided by SELLER. The construction quality standards that 
are set forth in the IVORY HOME WARRANTY shall be the 
sole and exclusive standards applicable to the HOUSE. 
(Emphasis added). 
See Real Estate Purchase Agreement at R.360. 
8. Section 3.8 of the agreement states: 
EXCLUSION OF OTHER WARRANTIES. Except for the 
IVORY HOME WARRANTY and SELLER'S obligation to repair 
or replace WALK-THROUGH ITEMS" (a) SELLER conveys the 
PROPERTY to BUYER, "AS IS, WHERE IS," WITHOUT 
REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR 
IMPLIED, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF 
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE, HABIT ABILITY OR WORKMANSHIP: (b) 
SELLER makes no representations or warranties to BUYER that 
any particular view exists or shall continue to exist from the 
PROPERTY or regarding the environmental condition of the 
PROPERTY (including the presence or freedom from radon, 
hazardous waste or hazardous materials); (c) SELLER expressly 
disclaims any other representations or warranties regarding the 
PROPERTY; (d) BUYER accepts the PROPERTY in the condition 
in which the PROPERTY exists on the CLOSING DATE; and (e) 
BUYER releases SELLER from any liability for the PROPERTY 
under federal or state environmental laws, including, but not 
limited to , claims under CRCLA and RCRA. 
See Real Estate Purchase Agreement at R.360. 
9. Section 7.7 of the Agreement states: 
ENTIRE AGREEMENT. 
BUYER hereby represents to SELLER that BUYER is not relying 
upon any warranties, promises, guarantees or representations made 
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by SELLER, by one acting or claiming to act on behalf of SELLER 
or by a SELLER AFFILIATE, unless the same is reduced to writing 
and is made a part of this AGREEMENT. This AGREEMENT and 
the documents that are specifically referred to herein constitute the 
entire agreement and understanding between BUYER and SELLER 
with respect to BUYER'S purchase of the PROPERTY and cannot be 
amended, changed, modified or supplemented except by an instrument 
in writing signed by both parties, but no such modification needs 
consideration to be binding. This AGREEMENT supersedes all prior 
agreements, correspondence, memoranda, representations and 
understandings of the parties relating to the PROPERTY, whether oral 
or written. No representations have been made to induce the parties 
hereto to enter into this AGREEMENT except as are set forth herein. 
Any agreements, representations, covenants and warranties on the part 
of either party hereto that are contained in this AGREEMENT and any 
amendment and supplement hereto shall survive the CLOSING and 
deliveries of documents and instruments hereunder and shall not be 
merged into such documents and instruments. 
See Real Estate Purchase Agreement at R.361. 
10. Plaintiff acknowledged signing and entering into the subject Agreement with 
Ivory North. See Deposition Transcript of James Fennell at R.352. 
11. On or about December 22, 1995, Plaintiff signed the Ivory Home Warranty, Warranty 
Certificate which indicates that Plaintiff received the Ivory Homes Express Limited Warranty. 
See Deposition Transcript of James Fennell at R.352 and Ivory Home Warranty, Warranty 
Certificate, R.371. 
12. The Warranty Certificate states in Section 7 that "[T]he Homebuyer understand, 
and by signing this form do hereby acknowledge, that the warranty is an EXPRESS LIMITED 
WARRANTY and that no person or entity shall have any liability whatsoever, by implication or 
otherwise, for claims which are not EXPRESSLY covered by the General Provisions and 
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Warranty Standards. N O CONSEQUEN I IAI • D AA fAGES t \ R E CO V ER ED B \ I I IIS 
WARRANTY. Sec Ivory Home Warrant). W arrantx Certificate, R.371. 
1,7, EXCI I IS10NS 
Buiilldei Is i lot i espoi isible foi : 
1.7! 1 >eiects not resulting in actual physical damage or loss. . . . 
. -.;. .a,iiuar\ walls, retaining walls, and bulkheads 
1.7.11 l.i »^ oi use, loss of opportunity, lovi wl in.iiki'l < .line !nv, < i,nl ,ih ie 
or any other consequential loss. 
1.7.16. Loss or damage externally caused, including, but not limited to; acts of 
G o d , . . . mud s l ides , . . . abuse or use of the Home, or any part thereof, beyond 
the reasonable capacity of such part for such use, or by any other external cause 
1.7.18. Loss or damage resulting from or made worse by subsidence or soil 
movement. 
See Ivory Homes Express Warranty at R.377-78 
14. Ivory Noi th constructcvi \\K iiuiiu n^a iuJ on I ot ^1 of Falcon Ridge which was 
inspected and approved by Fennell. See R.4-5. 
15 • ;; *or; 11 conveyed title to the subject property to Fennell by deed dated 
December 22, 1995, and Fennell moved into the hon ie Sc •« " R 1 5. 
16. Fennell alleges that on April 14, 1998, a landslide occurred on the back portion of 
the lot See R 5. 
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17. No one was physically injured as a result of the landslide, nor was any other 
property damaged or destroyed. See R.783. 
18. On or about April 7, 2000, Fennell filed a Complaint. See R.2-11. 
19. Green and Wall did not disclose to potential purchasers of Lot 31 the geologist 
reports and geological hazards of Lot 31 on the Subdivision Plat. R.1348. 
20. Defendant Green and Wall did not disclose to potential purchasers of Lot 31, 
including Ivory North, the geologist reports and geological hazards of Lot 31 in the protective 
covenants. R.1348. 
21. Defendant Green and Wall did not disclose the geological hazards of Lot 31 in the 
contract of sale to Ivory North. R. 1348. 
22. Defendant Green and Wall did not disclose the geological hazards of Lot 31 in the 
deed of conveyance to Ivory North. R. 1348. 
23. On or about May 17, 2001, Ivory North filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
See R.330. 
24. On October 25, 2001, the trial court heard Ivory North's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. At the hearing, Fennell waived his claim for breach of implied warranty. See, R.1705 
at pp. 76-77. 
25. The Court after reviewing the submitted memorandum and hearing oral 
arguments granted Ivory North's motion for summary judgment on all causes of action. 
Generally, the Court held that Fennel failed to properly dispute the relevant facts set forth in 
8 
Ivory N o r t h ' s mo t ion mid 'llinvlnn/,, Ivors Mnrlli"1-, Slatetiietil of I 'ndisputed I .kt ' . we ie d e e m e d 
admi t t ed due to tiu .ack of r e sponse . See R. I 70S at 92 Specif ical ly , the Cour t held that n w a s 
5 T
 . Oi- v L . o - _\_ai ^ ,;.;it;oi.
 t ;. ;ue 
subject proper ty had no knowledge of the repot i ami e\aluaiion of dhe property prepared by 
i L .a: .1. M\icagcoi ilic posNiniiii'- -; i.ne subject property being the site of 
potential landslides. See R.1705 at 92-94. 
S U M M A R Y OF A R G U M E N T 
1. I he trial court proper!\ jn'anlrd f \on Nnnh ' s Molimi loi NIIMIIIUM Iiidgrnuiif 
based on Fennel 's failure to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(B), I Itah Rules of Judicial 
\ dn iii listratioi i 1 \ 1 ii ::1 11 eqi iir "s a pai t> coi itestii ig a N lotioi i fc -\ Si n i n nary Judgment to include a 
section that contains a verbatim restatement of each of the movant 's statement of facts as to 
1
. Ik I. ilie \\\\\\ u iihiids a genuine issue exists . a l o s w d by a concise statement of material facts 
which support the party 's contention. In the instant case, in his memoranu; >pp* 
Fennel; .; Motion lor Nummary Judgment, Fennel did not dispute any of Ivory North 's statements 
of undisputed facts. Thus the trial court 's enti y • :>f si n nmai > ji idgmei it ii i favoi :>f h > oi ] '" 1 k Jon th 
was proper and should be upheld, 
2. '1 h* * * ..• \ . \ ledge 
of any geological condition on the subject property, the Maughan report or evaluation of the 
•
 ?
 • = .•. - . •'•" . <-pji:> oeing the site of potential landslides. It 
is undisputed that Ivory North did not have any knowledge of any alleged geological rr -hi.- -
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with the subject property, that Ivory North was never provided with a copy of the Maughan 
report, or advised of any alleged problems with the subject property. Accordingly, the trial 
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Ivory North should be affirmed. 
3. The Appellate Court should deny Fennell's appeal because it does not comply 
with Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In particular, Fennell's brief does not include 
a coherent statement of the issues presented for appeal nor in the statement of facts relevant to 
the issues on appeal include a single proper cite to the record. Consequently, the Appellate Court 
should reject Fennell's appeal and assume the correctness of the trial court' entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Ivory North. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED IVORY NORTH'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON FENNEL'S FAILURE TO DISPUTE 
THE RELEVANT FACTS SET FORTH IN IVORY NORTH'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Rule 4-501 (2)(b) states: 
Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities 
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's 
statement of facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists 
followed by a concise statement of material facts which support the 
party's contention. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of 
the record upon which the opposing party relies. All material facts 
set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an 
accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the 
purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by 
the opposing party's statement. 
10 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Fenneli contends on appeal that the trial court abrogated it^ duties b> LM anting Mimr..ary 
Administration. Ilowever, the language of Rule 4-501 (2)(B), Rules of Judicial Administration, 
slakabh \no\ ink s iluil unless specifically controverted, all material facts set forth in Ivory 
North's statement and supported by an accurate reference to the record are deemed adinilloil' In 
his memorandum in opposition to Ivory North's motion for summary judgment, Fennell clearly 
failed to controvert, specifically 01 otherwise (lie maleti il f;n Is sel Inilh in !< m Ninlli 
statement of undisputed facts. In fact, when questioned directly b> the trial court regarding his 
.. - ••• '• , mav Have been Jelicient. 
See R.l 705 at 43. 
\ . ', .-iNv> aiiiucs on appeal e.ue; ne complin v\ ,M. a - nile a", it existed at the time of 
briefing and arguments. I he basis for Fennel's argument is that the t 
applied ,.ic \oveniber 2001, amendments to the iule. However examination o\ die rule a^  ?! 
existed in October 2001, shows tlIO n 11 e • 1111 11 • 111111 n I I vi n 11 11 I 111 [ n1111 111e h 111 \ N u1111 s 
statement of undisputed facts. 
Fennel linalls argues on appeal (Ii,il i \ I lu diili I \ iiipL \ Ih nile il was improper 
for the trial court to grant summary judgment because the adverse party is entitled to have the 
• • > . . . = a ei IK IK HI t and all" reasonable inferences. , . however, the record shows that the 
trial court did not rely solely on Fennell's failure to comply wiih Rule 4-501(2)(B), Rules of 
Judicial Administration, when granting Ivory North's motion for summary judgment. Rather, 
the record clearly shows that the trial court determined that summary judgment was appropriate, 
as a matter of law, because the pleadings filed and matters presented did not create genuine 
issues as to any material facts. 
Given the foregoing, upon examining the trial court's order granting summary judgment, 
the trial court did not err in applying the governing law and the trial court correctly held that 
there were no disputed issues of material fact. Thus, the trial court's entry of summary judgment 
in favor of Ivory North was appropriate and should be upheld. 
In addition to the foregoing, Utah law clearly allows that the Appellate Court may affirm 
a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not 
relied upon by the trial court. Otsuka Electronics (USA, Inc., v. Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937 
P.2d 1274, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
The Utah Supreme Court has conclusively determined that a cause of action for breach of 
implied warranty of habitability does not extend to the purchasers of residential property. 
American Towers Owners Assh, Inc. v. CCIMech, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996). 
The main policy reason behind extending an implied warranty of 
habitability to residential leases are the unequal bargaining position 
of the parties and the prospective tenant's limited ability to inspect 
and repair the property. These policy reasons are not present to the 
same degree in the purchase of residential property. The purchaser 
has the right to inspect the house before purchase as thoroughly as 
that individual desires, and to condition purchase of the house 
upon a satisfactory inspection report. Further, if there are 
particular concerns about a home, the parties can contract for an 
express written warranty from the seller. Finally, if there a 
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material latent defects of which the seller was aware, the buyer 
may have a cause of action in fraud. Therefore, the circumstances 
presented ic the purchaser of a residence are not closely analogous 
to those oi a relatively powerless lessee 
Maakv. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d a* ^X" -:S' ; • -
Supreme Court later upheld the reasoning in Maak, stating that "[t]he terms of a contract for the 
and seller have similar bargaining power. If the seller refuses to accede to an express warranty, 
ill : thing pi evei its the bi i> ei ft om halting negotiations and looking elsewl(uc," American Towers, 
930 P.2d at 1193-94. 
Additional * .in. keai v.state Purchase Contract between T\w\ North and pLfntiff 
explicitly excludes any implied warranties !'h ' •^itnu »• 
EXCL — iN OF OTHER WARRANTIES. Except for the 
IVORY HOME WARRANTY and SELLER'S obligation to repair 
or replace WALK-THROUGH ITEMS" (a) SELLER conveys the 
PROPERTY to BUYER, "AS IS, WHERE IS," WITHOUT 
REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR 
IMPLIED, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF 
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE, HABITABILITY OR WORKM 4NSHIP 
added). 
I he I Jtah Supreme *, ^ urt has upheld "as is" provisions in real estate contracts and found that they 
properly exclude breach of implied warranty claims. In 7Ibbitts v. ()n- ; 
425 P.2d 160 (1967). the Utah Supreme Court held, in regard !»• the \ endees' counterclaim for 
bri'.i. »*• '•• ' ' • .- i provision in 
the contracts justified the court's refusal to submit to a jury requested instructions upon breach of 
implied warranties. The court initially found that the vendees had not filed the breach of 
warranty claim within a reasonable time, but also indicated that the contract provision, which 
stated that the vendees accepted the property in its present condition without representations, 
covenants or agreements between the parties, was controlling. The Utah Supreme Court referred 
to the Utah Commercial Code and stated that although it was not in effect for the subject 
contract, the reasoning by analogy was appropriate. The Court quoted Section 70A-2-316(3)(a) 
which states that "unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are 
excluded by expressions like 'as is,' 'with all faults' or other language which in common 
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes it plain that 
there is no implied warranty." The Utah Supreme Court found that based upon the above 
reasoning there was no error in the trial court's refusing to submit to the jury a requested 
instruction on the breach of implied warranty. 
Likewise in the subject matter, the Real Estate Purchase Contract contains even more 
explicit exclusionary language. The Real Estate Purchase Contract states that not only does 
Ivory North convey the property to Plaintiff, "as is, where is, without representation or warranty, 
express or implied," but that Ivory North also explicitly excludes all warranties other than the 
Ivory Homes Express Warranty, including "warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular 
purpose, habitability or workmanship." Therefore, even if Utah did recognize a cause of action 
for implied warranty of habitability in the purchase of a residential home, the contract between 
Plaintiff and Ivory North conclusively excludes the warranty from this matter. 
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judgment in favor *•? l \o: \ North on the basis that the Real Estate Purchase Contract between 
*, • ;• i\ [i\\ :icu Aananties. 
- * ; • » H K I P R O P E R L Y CONCLUDED T H A T IVORY N O R T H 
Di i; ANY K N O W L E D G E OF ANY G E O L O G I C A L CONDITION 
ON 1HL SUBJECT P R O P E R T Y O R T H E POSSIBILITY O F T H E SUBJECT 
P R O P E R T Y BEING T H E SITE OF P OTENTI 41 1 LANDSLIDES 
One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose 
iransaction is consummated, matters known in him that the othei I* 
entitled to know'. . . . First Sec. Bankv.Banberry Dev. Corp., .-s^ M s * v • . ) 
(emphasis added). 
In his Complaint I ;e:t n lell allege :i that h / : i y ] loi tl 11 lad a cii ity t : • I "et n ie.ll to disclose that 
Lot 31 was the site of landslides and erosion. Fhis presumes, of course, that Ivory North knew 
!
' -• ' ; s \ icu :ut \\ a., and Green, not Ivory 
North, developed, subdivided, and improved Lot * 1 of the Falcon Ridge subdivision. It is 
equall)/ i indisputed that V V all & Green never prm ^.ku fvory North with a copy of Glenn R. 
Maughan's geological report and that Wall & Green never iniuis ^ 
problems existed with . * . • NV- P l ^05 at 92, 93. Finally, it is undisputed that Ivory North 
was never told aboui up v problems wiui i I "Inl nhl.uimr I hr I < «| uu M.I luuUmy peinnl and 
licenses. Id. at 55. 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court properly concluded that Ivory North did not have a 
duty to Fennell because Ivory North did not have any knowledge of any alleged geological 
condition on the subject property and summary judgment in favor of Ivory North was warranted. 
III. THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD DENY FENNEL'S APPEAL BECAUSE IT 
DOES NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 24, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, specifically requires Fennell to provide a 
statement of the issues presented for review. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). Additionally, Rule 24(e) 
states that "[reference shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to ' 
Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement 
prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) pt 11(g)." Id. Finally, Rule 24(j) states that briefs which are not 
incompliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court 
may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer. Id. 
In his brief, Fennell did not set forth a coherent statement of the issues on appeal or 
properly cite to the record. Utah's appellate courts have on many occasions "voiced their 
frustration with briefs which fail to comply with Rule 24" and "have routinely refused to 
consider arguments which do not include a statement of the facts properly supported by citations 
to the record." State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 
612, 13 (Utah 1987) (appeal dismissed because the appellant did not support the facts set forth in 
his brief with citations to the record as required by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure); 
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 746 P.2d 1182, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (where a party 
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facts are supported, the COUP V\J I :»ssunie the correctness of the judgment below ); I 'ckermnn v 
consider any facts not proper \ cited u • . »r supported by. the iccord), Steele v Hd of Rev. of 
. .. * '* J .. ; -: Ju.t* a party Uiils to proMde a 
statement of the facts along with a citation to the record where those facts are Minnoruv v. \ 11 
assume the correctness of inc judgment). 
Given that Fennell did not set forth a coherent statrnii il nl llin iv.tiCN •• * 
properly cite to the record, Fennell's appeal should be disregarded or stricken and the trial 
u i i i f i i|(|" n l ^ ( l i i i i r i . i r i \\\i l i ' f i i i ' i l l in ln'i n i I I' U ln i lL j i l n ' i i ^ i l 
CONCLUSION 
• • agoing reasons, l\or> ,\>>;ii. nunc:-, iliis ' our. ;<• deny Fennell's appeal and 
affirm the trial court entry of summary judgment in its favor. 
DATED this 16th day of September, 2002. 
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